

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 12 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G. BUNN

(United States of America)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

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Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJENERE

Mr. M. E. BRINAH

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

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Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
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Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. Y. M. VORONTSOV
Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. H. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. G. BREAM
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Mr. D. PROTITCH

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Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the two hundred and seventy-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): General and complete disarmament, which is the item listed on our agenda for today, remains for all of us in this Conference the basic goal of our work -- or so the Canadian delegation believes. At our last meeting the representative of the United Arab Republic made a very interesting statement on that subject (ENDC/PV.271). After describing the progress of negotiations over the last few years, he made a number of thoughtful suggestions with a view to overcoming the impasse that at present exists on how to reduce and then eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapon vehicles. We have noted his comment that the idea of nuclear deterrence has now been accepted by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Perhaps the long and often seemingly futile exchanges we have had here in past years on general and complete disarmament have made us all aware of the rough balance of nuclear deterrence which has been established between the two super-Powers and their respective allies on both sides.

One conclusion which results from the situation described by the representative of the United Arab Republic is that few of us in this Committee, and few responsible people elsewhere, believe in the possibility of getting rid of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles as a first step towards disarmament, as some delegations have suggested. In our view, it is clear that the process of reduction to an agreed level cannot take place too precipitately, for fear of the destabilization between the nuclear Powers of which Ambassador Khallaf spoke in his statement (*ibid.*, p. 11). The representative of the United Arab Republic also alluded to the effect it would have on the security of European States. We are, of course, speaking of retaining nuclear deterrents during the disarmament process; at the end of that process all nuclear weapons should be disposed of as provided in both draft treaties.

The need to move cautiously from the position of "peace through deterrence" to "peace through disarmament" is one of the reasons why the Canadian delegation does not favour the proposal for a conference to sign a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1909 (XVIII)). Canada was among those States which, at the United Nations General Assembly in 1961, did not vote in favour of resolution 1653 (XVI)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

which proposed holding a conference to sign a convention on that subject. As we explained at the time and have since, we took that attitude not because we lacked sympathy for the objectives of the sponsors of that resolution. We certainly share the abhorrence of the means of mass destruction which has been expressed by the Ethiopian and other delegations here and in New York. But it is our considered view that the only responsible way to deal with the nuclear threat is through balanced measures of arms control leading to general and complete disarmament -- concrete measures that can be verified, not mere verbal undertakings. In the fear and fury which any war between great Powers would unleash, such conventions banning the bomb would not for long halt recourse to nuclear weapons by those countries which still have them in their arsenals.

I think it is agreed in this Committee that a rough balance of nuclear deterrence exists. I hope it will also be agreed that it would be dangerous to disturb it by disarming in a way inconsistent with the Agreed Principles of 1961 (ENDC/5). The question is: how do we go about reducing the levels of nuclear weapons and their vehicles in an equitable fashion? The Canadian delegation would welcome the establishment of a working group to examine these questions without pre-conditions, as suggested by Ambassador Khallaf at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.271). In its deliberations it could well examine ideas such as those the representative of the United Arab Republic has put forward. We look forward to hearing the views of other delegations on that point.

I should now like to turn to the measures of arms control which, in the Canadian delegation's view, should help to pave the way to progress on general and complete disarmament. As we all know, one of the measures most urgently needed to deal with the nuclear threat is a comprehensive test ban. It has often been pointed out how such a comprehensive nuclear test cessation treaty could inhibit the arms race by prohibiting the testing of new weapons, how in the same way it should act as a barrier to proliferation of nuclear weapons, how it would be a heartening sign of continuing will to find ways of settling political differences and promoting the relaxation of international tension. We may not be able to achieve a comprehensive underground test ban. Could we come to agreement on something less? Several steps towards such an agreement have been mentioned by the representative of Mexico. We would agree with his remark (ENDC/PV.269, p.28) that such steps should not necessarily be linked with a moratorium. We hope we shall have the views of the nuclear Powers here on the technical feasibility of what Mr. Gomez Robledo suggested.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We are all aware of the problems which have so far prevented agreement on how to prohibit all underground tests. We are also aware that continuous efforts are under way to develop technical means of reducing these differences. Canada supports the goal of co-operation in seismic matters and is prepared to pursue such efforts with other interested parties, in line with the valuable initiatives taken by Sweden (ENDC/154; P.V. 247, 256), recognizing that technical capabilities have an important role to play in identifying underground seismic events. We are glad to note that both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed positive interest in that sort of international co-operation.

In passing, I should like to refer to some other comments made by the Soviet representative at our last meeting. He suggested that by putting forward a demand for on-site inspection as part of the verification process the United States was creating artificial obstacles on the road to agreement. He implied that that was done in order to impede agreement and thus enable the United States to continue underground tests for the purpose of developing new types of nuclear weapons. He suggested that the United States had a programme of nuclear testing planned for the next several years, and he implied that the United States would not agree to a test ban until that programme had been completed (ENDC/PV.271, p.23).

However, the United States representative has pointed out that the Soviet Union is also carrying out underground tests. The existence of these programmes of testing should not be particularly surprising. Any modern government is expected by its people to make plans for various contingencies. But the mere existence of plans or programmes as such does not mean that they must be carried out or that they cannot or will not be changed if circumstances so require. What we are trying to do here -- or should be trying to do -- is to discover the conditions under which such tests can be stopped by agreement.

During this session there have been a number of interesting suggestions regarding the prohibition of underground tests put forward by the delegations of several non-aligned countries. The Canadian delegation finds that these ideas are very helpful and we hope that those and other delegations will persist in their efforts to find some solutions to these matters. There is all the more reason to do so as the prohibition of underground tests would be of significance not only to the great nuclear Powers, as our non-aligned colleagues have rightly pointed out on several occasions.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation has those suggestions under continuing study and may have further comments to offer at a later date. At this stage, however, I should like to make several remarks concerning the Swedish proposal on verification by challenge put forward by Mrs. Myrdal on 10 March (ENDC/PV.247) and elaborated at the meeting of 14 April (ENDC/PV.256). The representative of Sweden has clarified a number of previously hazy concepts which we have had in mind from time to time and has sorted them out into a coherent pattern which should provide a useful basis for discussion. It does seem to us that any comprehensive treaty will have to contain a step-by-step approach in cases where events require clarification, so that many potential conflicts might be resolved at an early stage in the process. We also agree that a treaty on underground tests should be a separate document from the existing partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1). I am sure we all recognize that a treaty prohibiting underground tests might be less stable than the partial ban and that the latter must not be weakened by events not directly related to it.

There may be some problems to overcome in such an approach, as our Swedish colleague will doubtless agree. We feel, however, that that pattern could ultimately form the initial steps of a verification system in a test-ban treaty. In this connexion we have noted Mrs. Myrdal's explanation that verification by challenge is not presented as an alternative to on-site inspection. As Mrs. Myrdal said: "It" -- that is, verification by challenge -- "does not per se raise any demands for inspections, but neither does it exclude them." (ENDC/PV.256, p.4). On that basis, there seems to the Canadian delegation no reason why we should not pursue discussion of that concept, develop it, modify it as required and work it into the framework of an eventual underground test-ban treaty.

I began my remarks with some comments on the rough power balance that exists at present, and I argued how dangerous it would be to upset that balance before and during the process of disarmament that we all hope will come about. But the fact is that that balance is presently in some danger of being disrupted as the race continues to find and develop ever more elaborate offensive and defensive weapon systems. This situation gives weight to the already clear necessity that we examine once again what must be done to control the arms race. The Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable L.B. Pearson, said in a speech in Scarborough, Ontario, on 25 June:

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"A thorough reappraisal is particularly appropriate today, when both the major Powers face the question of whether or not to take a significant step in the arms race -- that is, whether to produce and to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. The deployment of such a system would be an enormously costly undertaking which, in the end, would probably lead, as the ballistic missile race did, to ever-mounting defence budgets without any permanent increase in national security or international stability If the result of such re-assessment were a tacit understanding by the USA and USSR to refrain from the development of ABM systems -- and so prevent a new dimension of escalation of the arms race -- the dividends in terms of reduced tension and enhanced international stability would place us all in a much better position to examine the vital political issues which still divide us and which so largely determine our prospects for reducing armaments. Moreover, agreement not to deploy ABM systems would remove one of the reasons blocking progress towards a comprehensive test ban."

The importance of taking steps to deal with this potentially destabilizing situation has also been underlined in this Committee by our colleagues Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden (ENDC/PV.247, p.15), Lord Chalfont of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.265, p.5), Mr. Gomez Robledo of Mexico (ENDC/PV.269, p.23), and Mr. Khallaf of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.271, p.11). I believe the problem has been recognized by the responsible leaders of other countries as well.

At this point I should like to put on the record some extracts from the important speech made by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, on 18 May. That speech, which I am pleased to say was given in a Canadian city, has attracted a great deal of attention in the United States and Canada. Dealing as it does with some of the fundamental questions which will determine peaceful relations in the world in the years to come, it could usefully be read and re-read by all of us here. I am sure that the United States delegation would be pleased to provide copies. The brief extracts which I think it appropriate to quote today are the following:

"There is still among us an almost ineradicable tendency to think of our security problem as being exclusively a military problem -- and to think of the military problem as being exclusively a weapons-system or hardware problem

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"We still tend to conceive of national security almost solely as a state of armed readiness: a vast, awesome arsenal of weaponry

"We are still haunted by this concept of military hardware

"A nation can reach the point at which it does not buy more security for itself simply by buying more military hardware -- we are at that point."

We believe that the statesmen of the great Powers, and indeed their military advisers, if they think calmly of the problem of security in its widest aspect, will agree with those thoughts expressed by Mr. McNamara. But agreeing with a philosophical concept is not enough; something concrete should be done to stop the arms race, and to stop it before it enters another stage, which is sure to be enormously expensive and may upset what security exists in the present approximate balance of deterrence.

The question is: are we going to do something about this urgent issue before it is too late and the spiral of the arms race winds higher? One way, it seems to my delegation, is to agree not to increase the quantity of nuclear weapon vehicles -- offensive or defensive -- in the arsenals of the great nuclear Powers. Coupled with that there should be agreement not to elaborate or further develop existing nuclear weapon vehicles or to bring new ones into being. The United States has already put forward and elaborated a proposal designed to achieve that dual purpose. Mr. Foster, the representative of the United States, reiterated on 14 June:

"...if progress could be made towards a freeze we should be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles." (ENDC/PV.264, p.12)

The importance of those proposals was recognized at our last meeting by the representative of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.271, p.11). Other proposals have been made over the years for actual destruction of weapons, including bombers and missiles. Undoubtedly there are other possibilities.

The point is that all these ideas would help to deal with the very dangerous situation to which I alluded earlier. We are only waiting for an indication from the other major interested party that it recognizes the urgency of this issue and is prepared to sit down and work out some way of dealing with it.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): General and complete disarmament still remains the basic and most important task of our Committee; yet for the past two years this question has in fact been a secondary one in our negotiations. It must be frankly admitted that the Committee is not devoting to this question the attention which, in view of its significance, it merits. In our opinion this is due on the one hand to the fact that during the past two years the Committee has been mainly engaged in discussing a question which, despite its restricted nature, appears in the present situation to be the most urgent. I am referring to the discussion of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

However, the fact that general and complete disarmament has been left aside in our negotiations is due to yet another reason which derives directly from the whole discussion on this question. The negotiations on the question of general and complete disarmament have been, from the very beginning, quite rightly directed towards solving a key problem: the elimination of the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war by means of radical, consistent measures of nuclear disarmament. Despite the efforts of the delegations of the socialist and non-aligned States, the discussions on this subject have reached an impasse. The reason for this lies, above all, in the fact that the member States of NATO have adopted a negative attitude towards all proposals aimed at achieving a solution to this fundamental question of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament on the basis of a reasonable and mutually-acceptable compromise.

A number of such proposals have been submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has introduced into its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament several substantial changes, mainly relating to the question of nuclear disarmament -- that is, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1). In introducing these amendments the Government of the USSR sought to meet the views of the Western countries, particularly the United States. It has shown the greatest flexibility and a sincere desire to bring the respective positions closer together so as to enable a mutually-accepted agreement to be achieved.

All these drafts and proposals are sufficiently well known and have been explained many times during our negotiations. For this reason there is no need to revert to them again in detail. Among the most important of these is the readiness of the Government of the USSR to agree that, in the course of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet

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Union and the United States should have at their disposal a certain, precisely-determined number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads as an additional guarantee of their security. In connexion with this compromise proposal it was stressed once again that the Soviet Union and the other socialist States continued to prefer the complete accomplishment of nuclear disarmament during the first two stages of the process of general and complete disarmament. The proposal to retain the so-called "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) until the end of the entire process of general and complete disarmament was motivated solely by the desire to meet the demands of the Western countries and thus facilitate the achievement of agreement.

However, all these steps met with a negative attitude on the part of the Western countries. In contrast to the desire of the socialist countries to reach a compromise solution, the United States and other member States of NATO continued to insist on their initial, unacceptable demands. The United States has made no further changes in its draft treaty, such as would have helped to bring the respective positions closer together. It has not done so although the whole discussion in our Committee on the question of general and complete disarmament has shown that the United States draft (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) cannot become a basis for an agreement. The whole of this draft derives from a fundamental concept distinguished by the unwillingness of the United States Government to adopt radical and consistent measures which would lead to complete disarmament and to the elimination of the material means of waging war.

In the course of the negotiations it has become increasingly clear that the United States is unwilling to agree to such measures as would preclude and make impossible the use of force in relations between States. On the contrary, it is guided in all its conduct by the desire to retain for itself nuclear weapons and thus also the possibility of waging nuclear war. It is there that the basic reason should be sought for the negative attitude of the Western countries to all the proposals of the socialist and non-aligned States aimed at seeking a compromise solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament. That is the answer to the question why the negotiations on general and complete disarmament have been deadlocked; that is why, during all the five years of the Committee's activity, it has not been possible to make any progress in solving this problem.

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The Czechoslovak delegation fully shares the view expressed by a number of delegations that we cannot resign ourselves to such an unsatisfactory situation in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We are convinced that it is necessary to explore new possibilities, new approaches to the solution of this problem. A new approach does not consist in side-stepping the basic problem of general and complete disarmament: the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. The solution of this problem is the key to agreement on all other problems of general and complete disarmament. Therefore it is precisely in this regard that new paths and new possibilities for agreement must be sought.

We welcome the fact that the useful proposals which have been submitted lately by the delegations of certain non-aligned countries also point in this direction. Last year there was the proposal due to the initiative of the delegation of Sweden that the problems of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles should be discussed beginning with the third stage of disarmament (ENDC/PV.202, p.10). That proposal, of course, does not concern the essence of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, it could be of positive significance. In the third stage the differences in the approaches of both sides to the solution of this question are the least of all. Here, the two drafts which have been submitted come closest to one another. This could create a basis for reviving businesslike negotiations on general and complete disarmament and show new possibilities of solving the problem of nuclear disarmament. For this reason the Czechoslovak delegation supports the Swedish proposal. In our opinion the Committee, in its future negotiations on general and complete disarmament, should take this proposal into account and act in accordance with it.

At our last meeting a number of interesting ideas on the future conduct of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament were also submitted by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.271). Those considerations deserve attentive examinations with a view to taking advantage of all the useful ideas contained in the statement of Mr. Khallaf. The Czechoslovak delegation is studying those proposals in detail and will express its views upon them in due course.

I should like to make a few further comments today regarding collateral measures. Among these also, a very important place is occupied by measures relating to nuclear weapons and designed to reduce the danger of nuclear war. The emphasis which we place on these measures does not imply, of course, that we underrate the importance of other

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steps that would lead to a relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of trust and confidence between States; but we believe it to be right that, when negotiations on nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament are deadlocked, the Committee should devote its main attention to discussing steps to reduce the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war, steps which could be taken by way of collateral measures.

A number of proposals for the adoption of such measures have been submitted to the Committee. Apart from the question of non-proliferation -- which, at the present time, is the most important and urgent one and is therefore being discussed separately -- there was, first of all, the proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons; then the proposal to extend the prohibition of nuclear tests to cover underground explosions; and, finally, a number of proposals regarding the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

An important step towards reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war would be, above all, the achievement of an agreement to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The proposal of the Government of the USSR that the nuclear Powers should assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (ENDC/167) would also have considerable significance from this point of view. Much attention has already been devoted to the discussion of this measure not only in our Committee but also in the United Nations General Assembly. The discussion has shown that this proposal enjoys wide support among the governments of many States.

This was also proved by resolution 1653 (XVI) of the United Nations General Assembly, which was adopted on 24 November 1961 by a substantial majority. In this resolution of the General Assembly it was pointed out, among other things, that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Charter and also to the aims of the United Nations; and that it is contrary to the standards of international law and to the laws of humanity. The resolution states that any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. In this connexion the General Assembly supported a proposal to convene a conference for the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In later years the General Assembly has again called upon our Committee to discuss this question and contribute to its solution.

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The Czechoslovak delegation fully supports those appeals. We regard the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as a most important step, not only because it would substantially help towards reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and thus help towards improving the international atmosphere, but also because the solution of this problem would have a considerable positive influence on the discussion of other measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or an obligation assumed by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, would above all bring about favourable preconditions for the solution of the question of nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament. It would also contribute to the achievement of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and after the conclusion of such an agreement would help to strengthen its effectiveness.

It could be expected that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would counteract the tendencies to acquire nuclear weapons that might in future arise in certain non-nuclear States. It would also have considerable importance from the point of view of the just demand for guaranteed security which has been put forward by the non-nuclear States, and particularly the non-aligned States, in connexion with the discussion of non-proliferation. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would eliminate the danger that these States might become targets of nuclear aggression or of nuclear blackmail.

The situation is similar also in regard to the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would become a positive factor likely to have an influence on individual governments that might desire to arrange their own production of nuclear weapons, as well as on the nuclear Powers in regard to the further development of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would also exert a positive influence on negotiations in respect of proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

The proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons is attractive for other reasons also. Its realization would not in any way affect the so-called existing balance of forces. Lastly, great importance also attaches to the fact that no control measures likely to hamper the achievement of agreement would be involved. It is regrettable, therefore, that the Western States refuse to accept this measure and evade discussion of it in a businesslike manner.

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Another important step in the field of nuclear disarmament is the extension of the prohibition of nuclear tests to cover underground explosions. At the present time the pressure for a solution of this problem is rightly increasing. The Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), which prohibits nuclear tests in three environments, has not stopped the process of improvement of nuclear weapons. It has merely led to tests for this purpose being conducted underground. This is fully confirmed by the situation in the United States, where, according to published data, during the three years that have elapsed since the signing of the Moscow Treaty nearly 100 underground tests have been carried out.

There is no doubt that such a situation emphasizes the urgency of the demand for the prohibition of underground explosions as well. Moreover, it must be stressed that a solution of this problem does not encounter any objective obstacles. The carrying out of underground tests could be banned immediately, on the same basis as that on which the Moscow Treaty was signed. The only obstacle continues to be the obstinacy of the United States, which demands on-site inspection, basing this demand on the assertion that without such inspection the prohibition of underground tests would threaten the security of the United States.

But such an assertion does not stand up to criticism. First of all, the present level of scientific and technological knowledge makes it possible to exercise reliable control over the prohibition of underground tests by the use of national means of detection. To this must be added a number of other facts. It is obvious that if an agreement on the prohibition of underground tests were concluded, it would correspond to the interests of all the signatory States. Therefore all States would be interested in its implementation and would refrain from anything that might serve any government as a pretext for withdrawing from the treaty.

It must also be borne in mind that the risk involved in a possible secret attempt to bypass the treaty would be absolutely disproportionate to the results that could be expected from it. Even if, for the sake of argument, one were to admit the possibility of the secret carrying-out of an individual underground explosion, it is obvious that such an isolated test would have no practical significance and could not threaten the

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security of any party to the treaty. Only a series of tests could have more real importance. But such a series cannot be concealed. Moreover, the extremely serious international consequences for any State of the detection of an attempt to violate the treaty secretly would be an effective deterrent against such attempts.

In these circumstances the continuing insistence on on-site inspection is obviously meant to justify the unwillingness of the United States to take a political decision in principle on the question of prohibiting all nuclear tests. The crux of the matter is that the United States intends to continue improving nuclear weapons, and the complete prohibition of tests would hinder implementation of the United States programme. The validity of this conclusion is confirmed both by the large number of underground tests carried out by the United States in recent years and by reports that in the United States a large-scale programme of underground tests, to be carried out over the next few years, has been worked out and approved.

That is where, in our opinion, it is necessary to look for the main reason why the question of underground nuclear tests has so far not been solved. The desire of the United States to keep for itself the possibility of carrying out further underground explosions is obviously also the reason for the negative attitude of the United States delegation towards the realistic proposals for a compromise solution of the problem of underground tests which were submitted by some non-aligned States.

The last group of proposals regarding nuclear disarmament about which I propose to speak today are the proposals for establishing nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. The importance which the establishment of nuclear-free zones would have for reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war has already received general recognition. This is also confirmed by the number of proposals that have been submitted for the establishment of such zones. Following proposals for freeing individual parts of Europe from nuclear weapons, a number of proposals have been submitted for carrying out such arrangements in other parts of the world as well. Negotiations on this question have gone farthest in Latin America. The proposal to turn the African continent into a nuclear-free zone has also received widespread support (A/RES/2033 (XX)).

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The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic entirely supports all these proposals. However, for natural reasons we are interested most of all in the implementation of proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in individual parts of Europe. This position of ours is dictated not only by the fact that this area is closest to us geographically, but also by the importance of the European continent for the prevention of a nuclear war on a world scale. It is no accident that the proposal for the establishment of nuclear-free zones arose, on the initiative of the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6), precisely in this area. For reasons that are known to everyone, Europe is an area where there exists a constant danger of an outbreak of nuclear war.

That is why everyone recognizes the importance and urgency of steps that could lead to a diminution of that threat and to the strengthening of European security. These factors were stressed once again in the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, at our last meeting, in which he rightly pointed out the importance of solving the question of European security from the point of view of averting the danger of a nuclear war (ENDC/PV.271, p.10).

The socialist countries consistently devote primary attention to the problem of European security. They have submitted a number of substantive proposals the implementation of which would lead to this objective. At the same time they express their willingness to study thoroughly and discuss all other proposals relating to this problem. The interest of the socialist countries in the solution of the problem of European security received further confirmation a few days ago. Last week, in Bucharest, at a conference of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the leading representatives of the European socialist countries adopted a declaration on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe, in which the urgency of measures to reduce the threat of an outbreak of war in Europe was again stressed and the convening of an all-European conference to discuss the problems of ensuring European security and of organizing all-European co-operation was proposed.

The Czechoslovak delegation is convinced that the accomplishment of measures to strengthen European security and to reduce the danger of an outbreak of war in that part of the world would greatly facilitate the solution of the various problems which are under consideration by our Committee.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Any delegation which speaks on the problem of general and complete disarmament in the present circumstances will, I think, be under the sway of mixed feelings. On the one hand, all those who wish success to the Eighteen-Nation Committee feel depressed by the fact that after more than four years since we began our work, after more than 270 meetings and almost 1,000 speeches, the question of the preparation of a draft treaty on disarmament is deadlocked.

One cannot help asking oneself whether it is worth while reverting to this problem at this particular time, when the thunder of the United States bombs in Viet-Nam reaches our conference room with increasing loudness, when there looms ever more clearly the prospect of an extension of United States military operations in South-East Asia and the possibility of their escalating into a world conflict. Certainly, to invite those who are waging war to disarm is indeed no easy task. But, on the other hand, can one be silent when one sees how mankind is sliding towards the catastrophe of war because of those who make a profit out of war and out of preparations for it? It is not becoming clearer every day that the surest way to establish peace on earth is to abolish weapons and armed forces?

That is why we must not allow our interest in general and complete disarmament to slacken. Our Committee's basic task, the meaning of its work, are still the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In the present world circumstances, when there is a real danger of an outbreak of nuclear war, the question of general and complete disarmament acquires even greater significance. The complexity of disarmament problems and the difficulties in the way of achieving general and complete disarmament are known. For all the more reason we must continue, with perseverance and steadfastness, to seek a solution to these problems. This view has been expressed during our debate by the delegations of the socialist countries and by all the delegations of non-aligned countries that have made statements.

Like any international question, that of general and complete disarmament has its central problem. There is no doubt that in the atomic age the core of general and complete disarmament is the problem of nuclear disarmament. General and complete disarmament today means in the first place nuclear disarmament and the elimination

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of the threat of a nuclear war. Nuclear disarmament has become the most pressing problem of our time. Bearing in mind the paramount importance of these problems, at today's meeting I shall dwell mainly on certain problems of nuclear disarmament, without this being taken to mean that we underrate the elimination of other armaments. But nuclear weapons possess destructive and annihilating power incomparably greater than that of other weapons. Their use would not only inflict defeat on the war fronts; it would cause massive destruction and suffering to mankind and civilization, and, moreover, for many years ahead.

The use of weapons of mass destruction contrary to the laws of mankind and the standards of international law has already been prohibited in the past by international declarations and agreements. And if weapons of mass destruction have been prohibited in a general way by international agreements, then it is all the more necessary to prohibit nuclear weapons by an international convention. If these nuclear weapons are not prohibited by international agreement, in the present circumstances a world war would inevitably develop into a nuclear war. Any local war waged by the imperialist States in any part of the world could become the beginning of a world nuclear war.

That is what alarms the nations; that is why most States of the world, many eminent public leaders, scientists and representatives of the Church insist on the prohibition and complete destruction of this monstrous means of extermination. That is why it would be right that the process of disarmament should start precisely with this, and that the future treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control should provide for measures in respect of nuclear disarmament in the very first stages.

In our opinion, nuclear disarmament must envisage the prohibition of nuclear weapons as a means of waging war, the destruction within a given period of time, under international control, of all existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and the complete prohibition of their further manufacture. The implementation of such a programme would eliminate in a radical way the danger of nuclear war. During the present session of the Committee both the delegations of the socialist countries and all the delegations of the non-aligned countries have expressed opinions which have in view, to one or another extent, these or even other measures that would lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the abolition of nuclear weapons themselves.

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However, going completely against the interests of the peoples of the world, the delegations of the United States and the other Western Powers, for their part, have shown still more clearly during the discussion their unwillingness to begin nuclear disarmament and the fact that they do not intend, either now or in the future, to give up nuclear weapons. Recently there was even expressed here in the Committee the opinion that some hypothetical European federation, which would be set up in the distant future, let us say, for example, in thirty or fifty years or more, would be a nuclear federation, each member of which would participate in the ownership of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.267, pp.16, 17). Apparently some people imagine that even in the remote future, when we shall no longer be alive, nuclear weapons will be retained in the world as an instrument of aggressive policies, blackmail and war. After that we may ask ourselves: why, then, are we sitting in this Committee, what is the purpose of the Committee -- to find ways for disarmament, or to ensure for a future "European federation" the idyllic existence of nuclear armaments?

The Western delegations have so far been unwilling to adopt a single one of the constructive proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and by the non-aligned countries, concerning nuclear disarmament. They have declared that the measures included in the programme for nuclear disarmament put forward in the Committee by the Soviet Union are too radical, very drastic and impracticable, or that they imperil the security of the West. By using unconvincing and quite worthless arguments they have shown that they have no intention to set about defining more precisely either general principles or the method of solving the problem of nuclear disarmament. In order to justify their unwillingness to set about nuclear disarmament they have once again put forward and elaborated the old concepts of the so-called "deterrent role" of nuclear weapons, the so-called "upsetting of the military balance", and the "geographical factor". I should therefore like to deal briefly once again with some of these questions.

The Western delegations have made extensive use of the concept of the "deterrent role" of nuclear weapons as an argument against radical measures of nuclear disarmament. This concept has been developed very fully and precisely by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, in a number of statements. At the meeting of the Committee held on 17 March he declared:

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"It is the general opinion of specialists in international relations that the existence of these potentially devastating weapons is the most effective deterrent to any large-scale war. It would seem that we must continue to rely on this deterrent to large-scale war until there is a great improvement in the present state of international political relations and we can really achieve the objectives of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.249, p.7)

In essence, Mr. Burns upheld the same view today. This concept, as may be easily understood, is a new and dangerous development of the well-known formula of the past, "If you want peace, prepare for war", which was used to justify the accumulation of weapons and which led to devastating wars. History and the experience of a thousand years teach us that the accumulation of weapons has always led to war. All the more inconsistent and fraught with danger, therefore, is the theory that peace and international security can be built upon a nuclear powder-magazine and that the accumulation of nuclear weapons will supposedly lead to the elimination of war.

Logic suggests something quite different: in an inflamed international situation a single spark would be capable of causing a nuclear conflagration with all its consequences. We have all witnessed how closely, during the two international crises since 1960, the world felt the hot breath of nuclear war. In a period of international crises the weapons that have been accumulated may be used by mistake, and a mistake in the use of nuclear weapons will lead to fatal consequences. The world has not forgotten how hundreds of United States bombers with nuclear weapons on board took off because of an incorrect interpretation of the signals of the radar system. That is how nuclear weapons can easily turn from a "means of deterrence" into a means of destruction.

The theory of the "deterrent role" of nuclear weapons has nothing to do with the cause of peace, with the cause of preventing war, but merely serves as a justification for the unwillingness of the Western States to renounce nuclear weapons, and as a means of stimulating the nuclear arms race. We think the time has come to understand that in the present circumstances peace must be based, not on theories that lead to war, but on the foundations of sound principles of peaceful co-existence, on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Another concept, namely, that the elimination of nuclear weapons will upset the military balance between the two groupings of Powers, has also often been used in this Committee. The setting forth of that concept is designed to bring about the collapse of the negotiations on disarmament, for its absurdity is obvious even to its authors themselves, because it is based on arbitrary arguments and subjective conclusions.

The balance of forces, which means the preservation of the correlation of quantitative and qualitative indices of armed forces and their structure, is a matter which cannot be measured, controlled or respected. By setting forth the concept of military balance the Western Powers are shielding not only their rejection of nuclear disarmament, but also the thesis of all-embracing control over armaments from the very first stage of the disarmament process, as well as the retention of United States troops, missiles, aircraft and nuclear weapons in Europe. This is also the meaning of the argument about the geographical factor, to which the Western delegations often refer.

The task of this Committee is well known and we must not allow its accomplishment to be blocked by such unfounded theses and arguments, the aim of which is to sidetrack us into unnecessary discussions.

We have before us the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1), in which there have been worked out, on the basis of the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), all the problems of ensuring the effective and balanced implementation of measures of disarmament under strict international control while ensuring to an equal degree the security of all the States parties to the treaty. For this reason not only the Socialist countries but also many other States support the principles of that draft.

One of the greatest merits of the Soviet draft is that it provides for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war at the very outset of the disarmament process, through the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage and the destruction of nuclear weapons in the second stage. The Soviet Government has stated that it is also prepared to destroy the nuclear weapons themselves in the first stage if the partners in the negotiations agree to this. Since the Western delegations have expressed also at this session their disagreement on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, why not revert to

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consideration of the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), as has been proposed here both at this and at the preceding session? This has been urged by many delegations.

The proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" is designed to bring our position closer to that of the Western Powers, and its aim is to satisfy their demands for the provision of an additional guarantee of the security of individual States during the process of disarmament. That proposal makes altogether pointless the talk about preserving the "balance of forces" and the role of the "geographical factor" for the defence of the Western world, since it is proposed to leave at the disposal of the United States and the Soviet Union an agreed number of strategic nuclear devices which would be adequate for preventing any aggression. That idea was supported in the past, and is also supported now by a number of delegations in the Committee.

We consider that it is possible within the framework of the "nuclear umbrella" principle to explore ways for moving on to general and complete disarmament. Naturally one does not envisage the sort of "nuclear umbrella" which would enable a "disarmed" world to wage a nuclear war, but a real umbrella -- that is, precisely a guarantee additional to all the other guarantees of the maintenance and preservation of peace.

There is also before the Committee another proposal (ENDC/PV.202, p.10) designed to bring about progress in achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament: namely, to undertake first of all the detailed drafting of a programme of general and complete disarmament, not from the first stage, regarding which there are at present most differences, but from the third stage, in respect of which it seems that a certain similarity in the respective positions is beginning to appear. The drafting of a programme for the final stage of disarmament would enable us to see what the concluding stage of disarmament will look like and what measures will have to be taken, and in what sequence, in order to arrive at the last stage. Both at the twentieth session of the General Assembly and here in the Committee it has been stated that the Soviet Union accepts this method of work; but the Western delegations have so far given no reply on this subject.

In the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin, to the Committee (ENDC/167) it is proposed that the nuclear Powers should consider the question of carrying out immediately the programme relating to nuclear disarmament. That opens up new opportunities for solving this important problem; but that proposal too has so far remained unanswered by the Western States.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Instead, the United States delegation has stated twice that in the past the United States was already advocating the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, even at a time when only one nuclear Power existed. One may legitimately ask the United States delegation: if the United States really had and still has a sincere desire to eliminate nuclear weapons, then what prevents it from accomplishing this now when there are constructive proposals both by the Soviet Union and by a number of other States?

It is logical to hold that today, when vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been and continue to be built up, such a solution of the problem is all the more necessary and more urgent. Instead of that, however, the United States proposes such measures as the cessation of the production of fissile materials for military purposes (ENDC/120) or the demonstrated destruction of thousands of nuclear munitions (ENDC/165). But after all, you cannot empty a lake with a spoon or a bucket. This is the crucial point: the nuclear arsenals contain not thousands but tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. The question is not one of demonstrations, which can delude world public opinion into believing that something is being done while nuclear arsenals remain virtually untouched. A more radical approach to the solution of the problem is needed, and this approach is formulated in the Soviet proposal.

Moreover, the Soviet delegation has explained in the Committee that the proposal of the Soviet Government envisages both an independent solution to the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and a solution within the framework of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Since nuclear weapons differ radically from other types of weapons, such an approach is quite justified. There is no doubt that an independent examination of the question of nuclear disarmament would facilitate and accelerate its solution and would cause progress to be made in the question of general and complete disarmament.

Some delegations have urged the Committee to be realistic in its approach to the problem of disarmament. But can realism be understood to mean standing by with folded hands, dispassionate observers of the arms race, waiting for all the world's political problems to be solved under imperialist decree, when the peoples who are

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fighting for freedom and social progress would have ceased their struggle and when alone, as many people in the West believe, it would be possible to proceed to general and complete disarmament?

We also stand for realism, but we understand this question differently. Indeed, the problem of disarmament is closely connected with the world situation, and as long as the criminal military operations of the United States in Viet-Nam continue, progress in this field is difficult; but precisely for this reason we consider that the Committee should make further efforts to explore ways and means of solving the problems of disarmament before it. Much that is of practical use can be found in the statement and proposals made by the delegation of the United Arab Republic at the meeting of 7 July (ENDC/PV.271). In any case, the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament has become an historical necessity for our civilization and cannot be removed or erased from the agenda of international affairs.

However, until the States of the NATO alliance are ready to deal with the problem of disarmament in earnest, the Eighteen-Nation Committee can prepare the ground for a successful solution of the problem by agreeing on a number of collateral measures capable of barring the road to war. We must stress particularly the latest initiative taken by the States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, embodied in their declaration on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. Seven socialist countries, representing an impressive material and moral force, basing themselves on historical experience, on a thorough analysis of the international situation and the situation in Europe, and also on the agreements signed by the principal States victors of the Second World War, propose a number of measures which in the Committee are called "collateral", the implementation of which would decisively eliminate the danger of war in Europe and throughout the world and facilitate the task of achieving agreement on general and complete disarmament. We shall revert to those measures in our future statements.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): In the discussions on general and complete disarmament which have taken place during the last few meetings, certain statements have revived the idea of setting up a working group to study the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles. My delegation has always expressed itself in favour of this working group and is still convinced of its usefulness. The obstacle which has so far prevented the convening of this group is, as is well known, the requirement put forward by the Soviet delegation that the group should have a restricted and limited agenda. Indeed, during the discussions regarding this working group the Soviet delegation asked that when it was set up it should study only the proposals of the Soviet Union to the exclusion of all others.

As far as we are concerned, our thesis has been and still is that the working group should have very broad terms of reference and be authorized to examine all proposals submitted by any delegation whatsoever on the question of the progressive reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. That is an attitude which is far from negative, and I should like to bring it very particularly to the attention of the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria who, speaking this morning, stated that the failures we have suffered in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament are due to the "completely negative attitude" of the Western delegations.

That our attitude in regard to the terms of reference of the working group is just and inspired by substantial co-operation is shown by the new proposals concerning deterrence submitted to this Committee by our colleague of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.271, p.12). If we adopted the principle maintained by the Soviet delegation that only the Gromyko plan for a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) should be examined by the working group, Mr. Khallaf's proposals would evidently be excluded from the terms of reference of the working group. On the other hand, the very interesting ideas put forward by Mr. Khallaf are a further proof that the terms of reference of the working group should be as broad as possible and not restricted exclusively to the proposals of the Soviet delegation, however interesting and important these may be.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The only obstacle to the setting-up of a working group is that raised by the Soviet delegation. However, the Italian delegation hopes that a new assessment of the situation, particularly in the light of certain proposals which have been put forward by the delegations of the non-aligned countries and have met with a favourable reception this morning from our Czechoslovak colleague, may lead the Soviet and other Eastern delegations to reconsider their position regarding the working group, so as to enable this to be set up with broad terms of reference, on the understanding that it should aim at the progressive reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest possible level as rapidly as possible.

I should now like to leave the subject on the agenda of our meeting this morning and deal once more with non-proliferation. I should like to do so because, in my opinion, there is now in our discussions a logical sequence of ideas which should be followed without stopping, for this might perhaps narrow down our differences and bring us close to an agreement.

My delegation has already drawn the Committee's attention to the advantages of undertaking a careful comparison of the texts of the two draft treaties on non-proliferation which have been submitted respectively by the Soviet delegation (ENDC/164) and the United States delegation (ENDC/152 and Add.1). The Canadian delegation has supported this idea (ENDC/PV.270, P.11), and I should like to thank Mr. Burns for submitting a basic document (ENDC/175) on it. I remain convinced that, if this Committee would agree to start the work which the Italian and Canadian delegations have recommended, we could achieve some concrete results during this session, and not only on problems of minor importance.

Even if we leave aside the preamble and the other articles, where the two texts very largely coincide, interesting parallelisms also exist in articles I and II. One way in which to acquire nuclear weapons is obviously national production, the other being acquisition by transfer. In regard to manufacture the two texts, by almost identical provisions, prohibit both actual manufacture by non-nuclear countries and any assistance which might be given to them for this purpose by nuclear countries.

I do not think I need analyse articles I and II, paragraph 2, because the parallelism of the two draft treaties is obvious and what few differences there are

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could easily be eliminated. It would therefore be false to state that, in respect of the whole basic problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is a disagreement between the nuclear Powers participating in this Conference. Moreover, the agreement that exists in regard to production is certainly not negligible. What I think we should do is to indicate officially in our report the existence of this initial, albeit partial, identity of views between the Soviet Union and the United States.

My delegation has also drawn attention in its previous interventions to certain parallelisms in the first paragraph of articles I and II of the two drafts. This problem should be studied more deeply, and in order to do so I should like to recapitulate the discussions we have had so far on this subject.

In listening to the very restrictive interpretations which the Soviet delegation has given in its statements to articles I and II of its own draft treaty, we at first had the impression that the Soviet proposals went well beyond real non-proliferation. The Soviet delegation seemed to wish to take advantage of a limited collateral measure such as a non-proliferation agreement to impose limitations that would prevent the present defensive arrangements of NATO and render the military alliances themselves impossible. After some hesitation, the Soviet delegation stated that our objections were unfounded. Thus the Soviet delegation and, in general, the other Eastern delegations recognized the role of stabilization which alliances still play. They stated that, while desiring, just as we ourselves do, that military blocs should become superfluous, they had no intention whatever of undermining or destroying alliances and their essential collaboration.

Once it was thus established that alliances would not be prevented by non-proliferation the question arose as to what kind of collaboration in the nuclear field within an alliance was not proliferation. The Eastern delegations shied away from that question, and have not yet replied. As far as we are concerned, we believe that, once there is the assurance that a non-nuclear country which is a member of an alliance would be unable to fire nuclear weapons, and that it would have neither the right nor the material capacity to do so, collaboration within an alliance could take on fairly extensive and, so to speak, physical forms without giving rise to any danger.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In any case, and for all the more reason, it is obvious that this collaboration should include appropriate consultation corresponding to the objectives of integrated defence which are ours, it being established that, so long as consultative collaboration is concerned, it is absolutely impossible without acting in bad faith to see in this consultation, even from a distance, anything in the nature of dissemination.

I know that in regard to the first point - the non-disseminatory nature of physical nuclear co-operation excluding the firing of nuclear weapons - the Eastern delegations have serious objections. But it would be interesting and important to know what exactly is the position of the Soviet delegation in regard to the second point: consultative collaboration. It could obviously help towards orienting our action, which aims on the one hand at achieving a non-proliferation agreement and on the other at establishing increasingly confident, responsible and effective association between allies for common defence.

Mr. Roshchin seems in fact to have given us some indications on this subject (ENDC/PV.269, p.32). He asked what kind of consultation we were talking about - consultation on the use or consultation on the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This distinction seems to indicate that the Soviet delegation would not regard consultation on the use of nuclear weapons as disseminatory, whereas it would have objections to consultation on their manufacture. I say "seems" because, obviously, until we have confirmation or denial of this, I have only a personal interpretation to put before the Committee.

In regard to consultation on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, Mr. Burns has already replied (ENDC/PV.270, pp.17, 18). As far as we are concerned it seems obvious that, if such consultation took on the nature of assistance or encouragement in the manufacture of nuclear weapons - and I think that is what Mr. Roshchin had in mind - it would be unequivocally prohibited by articles I and II of the United States draft treaty.

As you see, we are endeavouring to understand the thought of the Soviet delegation; but we have to proceed by way of inference, without much help from the Soviet delegation. If the Soviet delegation would be so good as to explain its thought to us, the area of the divergences between the two sides could be better demarcated and clarified, and perhaps these divergences themselves would as a result become less serious and less insurmountable.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Passing now to another subject, still in the sphere of non-proliferation, I note that the Soviet delegation informed us of its intention to insert a new article into its draft treaty. It wishes in this way to meet certain security requirements manifested by some non-aligned countries within the framework of a treaty of non-proliferation. No one will deny the great interest of this proposal, but we wish to stress that it should logically be addressed solely to the countries which requested these assurances. It is the countries lacking nuclear guarantees, and those alone, which within the framework of a non-proliferation agreement legitimately raise the problem of their own security.

Undoubtedly the article proposed by the Soviet delegation is far from covering all the security requirements which might be wanted by non-nuclear and non-aligned countries when they forego any possibility of national nuclear defence. To provide for this, it seems to me that it would be necessary to devise a much broader system which without affecting the condition of non-alignment of these countries could give them, in the case of possible nuclear aggression or blackmail, positive and active guarantees, which would probably be collective.

This is all the more necessary since in the present circumstances, unfortunately, one may doubt that all nuclear countries without exception would agree to participate in a guarantee of non-use on behalf of the non-nuclear countries which renounce nuclear weapons. Indeed, once non-proliferation is established its preservation and maintenance will constantly require of militarily nuclear countries to behave with moderation and strict limitation befitting their grave responsibilities. If they took advantage of their nuclear strength to impose their wishes on non-nuclear countries through threats or blackmail, non-proliferation could be maintained only with difficulty.

Therefore within the framework of non-proliferation there must be jointly established active factors which would provide a guarantee against any eventuality of that kind. This is a difficult and delicate problem which is still unsolved; and for the solution of it we must not overlook either President Johnson's well-known proposal (ENDC/165) or the possible intervention and co-operation of the United Nations.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We do not intend at present to deal with the large number of questions raised by Mr. Cavalletti, but we should not wish to ignore one point on which he dwelt so insistently, when he asserted that the position of the Soviet Union in regard to the establishment of a working group was in fact preventing discussion and the normal course of the work of the Committee on questions of general and complete disarmament. From Mr. Cavalletti's statement it could be gathered that, were our Committee to establish a working group with the terms of reference suggested by him, the question of complete and general disarmament would go into the normal channel of its work and in a short time we could expect the activities of the Committee to be more successful than they have hitherto been in this field.

I should like to remind both Mr. Cavalletti and the other members of the Committee that this proposal has already been put forward here over a period of many years and met with acceptance, and the appropriate working group which was established by the co-Chairmen worked, I would say, very persistently in 1963 and tried throughout the entire summer to find common positions on questions of general and complete disarmament. But what was the result of the labours of the working group thus set up, which operated under the direct supervision of the co-Chairmen and reported here to the Committee?

Out of that vast problem, out of that enormous number of questions which were put forward with a view to agreeing a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, the working group not only was unable to reach agreement on a single article, but could not even agree on the preamble. And when they came to the agreeing of one article - the first - it then became clear that the positions of the Western Powers and of the socialist countries differed radically, that no working group was in a position to overcome the obstacles connected with the political differences on this question, and that in this case what was needed was not a working group but definite political decisions which, regrettably, the Western Powers were unwilling to take. Therefore we must state in connexion with the question raised by Mr. Cavalletti that we consider that the proposal which he has put forward at the present time for the establishment of a working group, on which he insists so

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strongly, is intended to create in fact a wrong, I would even say a false, impression in world public opinion of the process of work of the Committee and the conditions in which it is being carried on.

No working group could change the world situation which exists at the present time and which continues to deteriorate as a result of the actions of the Western Powers and, above all, the United States. There is taking place in the world a frenzied arms race the like of which has never been seen before throughout the post-war period. No working group, no matter how qualified it might be and no matter with what intentions it approached the consideration of this problem, would be able to alter the fact that the United States, during the present year alone, has increased its military budget by the huge sum of over \$15,000 million. Likewise, a working group would, of course, be unable to do anything to change the situation in which the Committee is examining the problems of general and complete disarmament. In this case I am referring to the war in Viet-Nam which was started and is being extended by the United States.

In these circumstances, of course, we must say quite categorically that Mr. Cavalletti's proposal to set up a working group would have no other purpose and no other meaning than to create a wrong and false impression in public opinion regarding the possibilities at the disposal of the Committee in solving the problems which it has under consideration, and in particular the problems of general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): In my capacity as representative of the United States I should like to make a few brief remarks in reply to the statement of the Soviet representative.

My recollection is that his delegation suggested the working group in the summer of 1964 after the difficulties that he described - the differences of view in 1963. The situation when Mr. Zorin was here in the summer of 1964 was that the Soviet Union proposed a working group and insisted that that working group consider only its proposal - the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). We said we should be very happy to participate in a working group if it considered other proposals, including our own. That is still the position of my Government.

(The Chairman, USA)

Secondly, I would suggest that the Soviet delegation is in no position to express outrage about Viet-Nam. The Soviet Government has not done what it can do to bring the war there to a halt. It has not performed its obligation as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China to reconvene that Conference, as suggested most recently by the Prime Minister of India. It has not taken the necessary steps to move towards a cessation of hostilities on both sides - to end the war, not only the bombing.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have only one comment to make. We are at present considering not the events in Viet-Nam but the problems of general and complete disarmament and the situation in which the work of the Committee is being carried on. Therefore we touch upon the questions of the military measures taken by the United States and the war in Viet-Nam, not only the point of view of examining and settling the Viet-Nameese question, but from the point of view of the possibilities of solving the problems of general and complete disarmament.

Therefore the reference by the United States representative to the fact that the Soviet Government is not taking any action in regard to Viet-Nam is in this case altogether irrelevant and only proves that the United States has created a completely unsatisfactory situation for the examination of the problems of general and complete disarmament. The United States now pleads that, in regard to the war which it has started and is constantly extending, something or other has not been done by the Soviet Union. In that case, if you have started a war and if you are extending it - well then, put an end to it yourselves. And there is no point in pleading that somebody is not doing something in order to enable you to end the war.

I repeat that we are, of course, not called upon here to examine the problems of Viet-Nam; we regard this matter exclusively from the point of view that the consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament is at present in such a situation that we are unable to take any practical steps forward and cannot take any political decisions here. Why? Because the escalation of the war and the escalation of the arms race has been undertaken on the most enormous scale;

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and it has been undertaken not by us, not by the Soviet Union, but by the United States. If you find that this hinders the work of the Committee and consider it necessary to find some remedy, then do what is necessary in order to end this war. End this war, withdraw your troops, cease the bombing of Viet-Nam! All this is within your power. But you do not want this. Why do you not want this? Because you wish to achieve certain political objectives which are altogether contrary to the elementary standards of international law. You do not wish to take account of these standards. That is why you are now turning your heads towards India, the Soviet Union and other countries. But you would do better to turn your heads in your own direction.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): In the last two meetings the problem of the working group has come up for discussion again. I agree with the analysis which has just been made by the Soviet representative in this regard. I believe that a working group could do useful work if agreement were reached beforehand on its terms of reference. Since it was not possible to reach such agreement, it seemed to us that the establishment of such a working group would be pointless. We still hold the same opinion.

As you know, the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of a working group to examine the implications of a definite concept: the maintenance of nuclear protection on both sides throughout the process of disarmament -- a nuclear protection of a well-defined nature.

Today the representative of Italy reverted to that proposal, but while he tried to convince us that he is in favour of a working group which would examine all proposals without excluding any, he fell back, I think, on a formula which certainly implies excluding. If I understood him correctly, he said that the working group should examine the methods of a progressive reduction of the nuclear potential during the process of disarmament. It is quite clear that, if the terms of reference of the group were drawn up in that way, it would exclude the possibility of examining the Soviet proposal.

(Mr. BLUSZTAJN, Poland)

I think that the Western delegations should be logical with themselves and take at last a decision on what they want this working group to do. One cannot wish for a working group that will examine all proposals without excluding any, and at the same time impose on it conditions prejudicial to one of the parties.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I believe the Polish representative has tried to turn the situation completely upside down: now it is we who are laying down exclusions. In fact the situation is very clear. Unfortunately, we do not have with us the records of the discussions that took place on this subject two years ago; but it was clear that the Soviet delegation asked, first of all that we accept in principle the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), and then set up a working group which would concern itself solely with the examination of the Gromyko proposal to the exclusion of all others.

On the other hand, our position was and still is quite clear: that we should set up a working group to study the progressive reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the reduction to take place as soon as possible and down to the lowest possible level. With such terms of reference, it seems to us, the working group would have to examine all the proposals that have been submitted, including, of course, the Soviet proposals and, I should now like to add, including the proposals submitted by the delegation of the United Arab Republic which also aim at the same objective.

As far as my delegation is concerned--and this applies, I believe, to the other Western delegations also -- our position is very clear: the working group should have very precise terms of reference regarding the objective, but they should be very broad and open to all possibilities in regard to examination of the various proposals. That is our present position.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I will now read a recommendation from the two co-Chairmen concerning the further course of our work:

"The co-Chairmen wish to propose to the Committee the following schedule of work. After finishing discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament today, the next four meetings should be devoted to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, after which four meetings should be devoted to other collateral measures and two meetings should be devoted to the question of general and complete disarmament. This proposal is not intended to interfere with the recognized right of any delegation to speak on any subject in any plenary meeting of the Committee."

If there are no comments or objections, I shall take it that that recommendation is adopted.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 272nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. George Bunn, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United States and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 14 July, 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.